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At the analytical core of critical macro-finance (CMF) stands a focus on the interlocking 
balance sheets of financial actors and the differential ‘moneyness’ of these agents’ liabilities. 
Inherent to this is the view that in contemporary capitalism, money is essentially credit money 
created by financial institutions. In such a finance-driven and interconnected world, liquidity 
becomes a crucial factor in determining the rise and fall of economic agents. 
By foregrounding the money-creating power of financial institutions and the importance of 
liquidity, CMF has strong theoretical affinities with Post Keynesian monetary and financial 
theory. Indeed, as we will argue below, it makes important contributions to the further 
development of Post Keynesian theory. However, despite regular references to the work of 
Hyman Minsky, these affinities and contributions are not always spelled out with sufficient 
clarity. In our contribution to this forum, we suggest that both CMF scholars and Post 
Keynesian monetary theorists would profit from a more explicit engagement with each other, 
and together could form powerful foundations for an important and evolving research agenda. 
With regards to further developing Post Keynesian theory, CMF has revived and built on 
the work of various authors who have highlighted the role of institutions and institutional 
conditions in shaping monetary dynamics. These include, among others, Victoria Chick, Sheila 
Dow, Jan Kregel, and indeed Hyman Minsky.1 Theoretically, it has productively linked the 
nature of money to the balance sheet characteristics of hierarchical (financial) institutions and 
the interlocking system of their assets and liabilities. This balance sheet interpretation of 
money has updated Post Keynesian monetary theory to the new reality of financialised, 
market-based financial systems.
At the same time, we hold that a more explicit engagement with Post Keynesian monetary 
theory could provide CMF with a broader theoretical underpinning and link its analysis more 
effectively to developments in the macro-economy. The work of Minsky and its emphasis on 
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the interrelated assets and liabilities of balance sheets and the fragility which can emerge as a 
result of a mismatch between the two is, of course, essential to this endeavour. However, 
Minsky’s work was developed from within Post Keynesian monetary theory, in particular via 
Keynes’ liquidity preference theory, and more generally via the assumption that money is 
credit money endogenously created by the banking system. 
In our view, Keynes’ liquidity preference theory can provide a useful, existing framework 
to ground CMF research beyond the work of Minsky, in particular with regards to the nature of 
money and the ‘moneyness’ of other assets. The Post Keynesian theory of endogenous money 
can substantiate the crucial and active role banks play in determining monetary and financial 
conditions in an economy and the intimate link between these conditions and the macro or 
‘real’ economy. It is this link, which so far remains rather implicit in CMF work, that must be 
fleshed out in order to demonstrate the wider importance of the CMF project.
Critical macro-finance’s contribution to Post Keynesian monetary theory 
CMF effectively links the liquidity of financial institutions with their interlocking assets and 
liabilities. In the work of Mehrling (2010), Gabor (2016; 2020) and Sissoko (2019) in 
particular, money markets are central to the dynamics of the financial system: it is in these 
markets that financial institutions manage the liquidity of their balance sheet, often in the 
form of collateralised lending. Problems in money markets therefore quickly become systemic 
as financial fragility is transmitted through interconnected balance sheets and financial 
institutions react to changing conditions. Moreover, by foregrounding the active behaviour of 
financial institutions and their ability to create different forms of money, CMF implicitly (and 
sometimes explicitly, as in Murau and Pforr, 2020) rejects a commodity view of money and 
instead adopts a credit theory of money. In this view, the liabilities created by hierarchical 
financial institutions assume varying degrees of ‘moneyness’ depending on their convertibility 
into fiat money, i.e., the liabilities of the nation state (see Pozsar, 2014; Gabor and 
Vestergaard, 2016). 
This institution-specific balance sheet approach to financial behaviour within a credit 
money world is often rooted in the work of Hyman Minsky. Minsky’s work also underpins the 
institutional view of money adopted in these approaches, which puts the asset-liability 
structure as well as hierarchical relations between different financial institutions at the 
forefront of discussions on the nature of money and its origination (Gabor and Vestergaard, 
2016; Mehrling, 2012; Neilson, 2019; Poszar, 2014). 
This balance sheet interpretation of monetary dynamics, which highlights the interplay 
between the assets and liabilities of hierarchically structured institutions – rather than the 
properties of different assets themselves – represents an important development of existing 
Post Keynesian monetary theory. Traditionally, authors who have further developed Keynes’ 
theory of money (the liquidity preference theory) have tended to focus primarily on the specific 
properties of an asset, which enable it to satisfy holders’ liquidity preference in isolation, 
rather than in relation to the liability structure of that agent. Focus in this work has therefore 
been on assets’ ability to store wealth and the speculative motive for holding money (Carvalho, 
1992; Chick, 1983; Davidson, 1978; Dow, 1987). An increase in liquidity preference is here 
largely due to a general rise in uncertainty in the economy. 
Minsky, on the other hand, explicitly considered both sides of the balance sheet and 
particularly the liability pressures on agents’ asset choices (Minsky, 1975; 1980; 1982; 1986). 
For Minsky (1975: 70), “in a capitalist economy, one way every economic unit can be 
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characterized is by its portfolio” which comprises both assets, generating cash inflows, and 
liabilities, generating cash outflows. Economic units speculate that their liability cash 
commitments can be met by cash receipts originating from their assets (Mehrling, 2000). CMF 
adopts and uses this balance sheet vision of economic behaviour to build its powerful account 
of dynamics in increasingly sophisticated and complex financial markets. In contrast to 
Minsky, who focused on non-financial corporations as the main drivers of capitalist dynamics, 
the CMF balance sheet view is instead applied to financial institutions as the key agents of 
financialised capitalism.
This balance sheet view of monetary dynamics adds to existing Post Keynesian monetary 
analysis on two grounds. First, asset demand might not only depend on existing portfolio 
preferences but also arise from the structural pressures of agents’ liabilities. Liquidity 
preference therefore becomes institutionally specific and depends on the nature of agents’ 
liabilities. This means that getting the asset side of things right (for example, through providing 
market liquidity, prudent economic governance, and so on) might not be sufficient to reduce 
financial vulnerabilities arising from the liability structure of financial agents (Kaltenbrunner, 
2015; Bonizzi, 2017; Bonizzi and Kaltenbrunner, 2018; see also our forthcoming work). 
Second, given these structural pressures, a Minskyan/balance sheet framework of 
hierarchical institutions points immediately to the power creditors can exert over debtors. This 
includes direct forms of power, for example those that are exerted to ensure repayment, but 
also indirect ones, in the sense that the conditions affecting creditors will often spill over to 
debtors, independent of the debtors’ conditions themselves. These power relations, as we will 
discuss below, are particularly evident in cross-border core-periphery balance sheet relations, 
where funding conditions in core financial markets have fundamental implications for asset 
dynamics in the periphery.2
In sum, CMF’s reference to Minsky and its analytical focus on the interlocking balance 
sheets of hierarchically placed financial institutions draw on and make important contributions 
to Post Keynesian monetary theory. However, references to Minsky aside, very often this 
relation remains implicit. Minsky himself though was part of a longstanding wider tradition of 
Post Keynesian economics and developed his work within this broader theoretical apparatus. 
The following sections make this relation more explicit and point toward the potential benefits 
of a stronger engagement between CMF and Post Keynesian monetary theory.
Liquidity preference theory and moneyness 
Although issues of aggregate demand and employment are most commonly associated with 
Keynes, money and finance have always been at the core of Keynesian economics (see 
Cottrell, 1994). In the General Theory, for example, Keynes argues that rather than a real 
variable (as in loanable funds theory), the interest rate is determined in the money market as a 
price that has to be paid to depart with the security provided by money in a world 
characterised by fundamental uncertainty (Keynes, 1936: Chapters 13-17). Money is the most 
liquid asset because it acts as a secure “abode of purchasing power” (Davidson, 1978: 149) 
and medium of contractual settlement which protects agents from the fundamental 
uncertainty created by the passing of real (or historical) time. It is held for three motives: the 
transactional, the precautionary, and the speculative.3 While the transactional motive hardly 
departs from the neoclassical view of money, the precautionary motive, i.e. the need “to 
provide for contingencies requiring sudden expenditure and … to hold an asset of which the 
value is fixed in terms of money to meet a subsequent liability fixed in terms of 
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money” (Keynes, 1936: 196), and the speculative motive, which aims at “securing profit from 
knowing better than the market what the future will bring forth” (Keynes, 1936: 170), both 
reflect Keynes’ innovative idea of a monetary production economy operating under 
fundamental uncertainty. For Keynes, money is an asset that is chosen from among other 
assets because of its non-pecuniary return in dealing with an uncertain world: “the possession 
of actual money lulls our disquietude” (Keynes, 1937: 216).
Whereas Keynes’ original liquidity preference theory was a dichotomous choice between 
two assets (bonds and money), many Post Keynesian scholars have interpreted it as a general 
theory of asset choice which defines assets along a return-liquidity premium spectrum 
(Carvalho, 1992; Kregel, 1988; Minsky, 1975; Wray, 1992). In this view, represented in 
Keynes’ own rate of return equation of Chapter 17 in the General Theory, the net benefit of 
holding an asset involves four elements: a yield (q), a carrying cost (c), an expected 
appreciation vis-à-vis the numeraire (money) (a), and a liquidity premium (l), where the rate of 
of return (r) is defined as follows:  
r = q + c + a + l
These attributes define a spectrum of assets among which wealth holders can choose, ranging 
from fixed capital assets, which offer high yield but little liquidity and high carrying costs, to 
money, for which the yield, carrying cost, and expected appreciation are nil but which offers 
the highest liquidity premium. Assets with different liquidity premia have to offer different 
yields to compensate for their relative illiquidity measured against money. The higher an 
asset’s liquidity premium, the closer it is to being money, and the lower the pecuniary return it 
needs to offer. Liquidity, in turn, is the ability to convert an asset at any time and with little or 
no loss into money. 
This concept of the spectrum of liquidity premium is, in our view, akin to the term 
‘moneyness’ as used in the CMF literature. Rather than through its functions, in this literature 
money is defined as an asset that trades ‘at par on demand’ (e.g. Poszar, 2014; Gabor and 
Vestergaard, 2016). This par convertibility creates a hierarchy of money depending on the ease 
with which different institutions’ liabilities are accepted by hierarchically lower placed 
institutions and ultimately can be converted into money proper, i.e., fiat money or money 
issued by the state. Gold serves as money between central banks, central bank reserves as 
money between banks, bank deposits as money between firms and households (Mehrling 
2012), and repos and other short-term financial instruments as money between shadow 
banks and banks (Poszar, 2014; Gabor, 2016). The easier and more secure the conversion 
into the money of the state, the higher the moneyness of an asset. 
The fact that there is a hierarchy of (short-term) assets depending on their ability to be 
converted into money proper has been a key insight of Keynes’ liquidity preference theory. 
However, in contrast to CMF’s institutionally defined hierarchy of money, from a Post 
Keynesian monetary viewpoint there is ultimately a clear distinction between money and other 
assets: there is only one asset that serves as universal unit of account and hence store of 
value and means of settlement. 
Whereas traditionally Post Keynesians have highlighted money’s unique ability to store 
value in the presence of fundamental uncertainty, from a Minskyan perspective, money is the 
universal unit of account and medium that can settle society-wide obligations denominated in 
that unit. In a monetary production economy, all the key economic functions are denominated 
and settled in money terms: wages, taxes, and in particular, debt obligations (see also Michell, 
2017). The object that liquidates contractual commitments denominated in the unit of account 
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is money, and for this reason it is ‘liquid’, i.e., its return is a pure liquidity premium. The 
liquidity premium of other assets, in this Minskyan world, reflects their varying ability to 
generate cash inflows relative to an investor’s liabilities, as well as an investor’s ability to 
convert those assets at no loss into the unit in which their liabilities are denominated, i.e., 
money. Therefore, liquidity preference does not only depend on the general level of uncertainty 
in the economy, but also on the demands of agents’ existing liability structure, whose 
obligations are to be settled with money. 
This qualifies the primacy that CMF gives to liquidity over solvency (Neilson, 2019: 72). 
While this primacy is consistent with a Minskyan interpretation of liquidity preference theory, it 
is important to stress that liquidity preference has a crucial forward-looking component. For 
many actors in the economy, whether they can “force a unit of cash-flow in [their] 
favour” (Neilson, 2019: 72-73) involves a substantial degree of speculation about the future. 
Future payments from liabilities and future inflows from assets are both uncertain and actors 
adjust their liquidity preference accordingly in order to plan ahead and match inflows with 
payments. These might look like solvency concerns, but in fact they are about being able to 
‘make position’ in the future, i.e., maintain access to money over the long term.
The uniqueness of money is particularly evident during moments of heightened 
uncertainty or crisis. Whereas in normal times, other short-term assets can become liquid 
stores of value with a liquidity premium, and indeed in Minsky’s view this ‘layering’ is inherent 
to economic booms, in moments of increased uncertainty only money is the universally 
accepted means to store value and settle obligations. This is important because, as discussed 
in more detail below, it connects the uniqueness of money to the dynamics of the broader 
economy. Keynes did not develop liquidity preference theory for its own sake, but because he 
wanted to show how the demand for money in the presence of fundamental uncertainty, and 
the interest rate as a price for departing with money, affect investment and hence broader 
patterns of capitalist development. 
Thus, on the basis of a liquidity preference interpretation of Minsky, rather than being 
institutionally specific, money remains a macroeconomic concept. It is both the universal unit 
of account for claims and the one means of settling these claims accepted by society as a 
whole. In today’s world, this means of settlement is legally enshrined and supported by the 
state. Empirically, it currently includes cash, central bank reserves, and bank deposits. Only 
these assets derive their value purely from their ability to settle transactions,4 and their 
liquidity, unlike that of other assets, is inherent to the design of the (capitalist) monetary 
system. As Minsky (1986: 78) puts it, “the creation of cash … is open only to the government 
and – in a special way – to banks”.
Critical macro-finance and endogenous money
The theory of liquidity preference as expressed in Keynes’ General Theory has one very 
important limitation: it assumes, more or less explicitly, that the money supply is exogenous 
and fixed by the central bank. Another key issue in Post Keynesian economics has therefore 
been the development of a theory of endogenous money, that is, a theory in which – in 
contrast to neoclassical theory, where prior savings finance investment – it is the credit 
extension by banks which, by simultaneously generating bank deposits, creates most money. 
Endogenous money creation therefore presupposes a credit view of money.
The precise nature and mechanisms of money’s endogeneity have been subject to 
intense debate among Post Keynesians. The original version of the theory, sometimes known 
as the ‘horizontalist’ or ‘accommodationist’ account (Kaldor, 1985; Lavoie, 1984; Moore, 
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1979), states that banks accommodate all demand for money by creditworthy firms. Similar 
concepts were also developed by the ‘monetary circuit’ approach (Graziani, 2003; Realfonzo, 
2006; Gnos, 2006), which emphasises the circulation of credit money in setting off capitalist 
accumulation: bank credit extension initiates the circuit of money, which circulates through the 
economy, and ends with debt repayments to banks. These views have been criticised by 
‘structuralists’ (Chick and Dow, 2002; Dow, 1996; Dow and Dow, 1989) on the grounds that 
they overlook the importance of liquidity preference in the process of credit supply. Key here is 
the liquidity preference of banks, which do not passively accommodate the demand for credit 
but whose decision to lend instead depends on the risk associated with the borrower and the 
total credit outstanding (lender’s risk). 
CMF scholarship shares much with the theory of endogenous money. In Mehrling’s 
(2012) hierarchy of money, what counts as money for most actors in the economy are the 
liabilities of financial institutions (including the central bank for institutions further up in the 
hierarchy), which are created by banks as a swap of IOUs. Furthermore, Mehrling (2020) 
considers Dow and Dow’s (1987) theory of liquidity preference compatible with his own, so 
long as it mainly refers to dealers in the money market. However, in abstracting from the 
origins of the endogenous money literature, CMF risks missing its wider role in explaining 
macroeconomic dynamics and the role of bank credit in particular. It is in large part for this 
reason that the CMF literature on shadow banking has come under criticism from Post 
Keynesian scholars (Michell, 2017; Botta et al., 2019; Bouguelli, 2019, Lavoie, 2019). 
First, endogenous money theory makes a clear distinction between initial and final 
finance that is rooted in wider capitalist dynamics. This is particularly important in circuit 
theory, where a distinction is made between
the demand for money to finance production (which Keynes called ‘finance motive’) and the demand for 
cash reserves (dependent on the transactional, precautionary and speculative motives). The finance motive 
explains the creation of money and its injection into the economy ... The demand for cash reserves leads to 
the formation of money stocks which are present at the closure of the circuit. (Realfonzo, 2006: 110-11)
This view is similar to but goes somewhat beyond Mehrling’s (2020) distinction between 
payment and funding, in that it highlights the appearance of money and credit at two different 
points within the monetary circuit, and thus its connection to the wider economic process of 
capitalist reproduction. Endogenous money theory’s key concern is to explain the workings of a 
‘monetary economy of production’ (Graziani, 2003). While it is certainly possible to abstract 
from it to explain the payment system, it is not “an obscurity” that the circuit starts with 
“financing the production of a new capital asset” (Mehrling, 2020: 9). It is the essence of the 
capitalist economy: capital accumulation for the pursuit of monetary profit, which starts with 
financing. 
Secondly, and as a consequence of the previous point, endogenous money theory 
highlights the special and active role of banks in determining credit conditions, and the 
intimate relationship between these conditions and the dynamics of the economy. This is key 
to understand Minsky’s famous ‘Financial Instability Hypothesis’. It is the ability and increasing 
willingness of banks to finance firms’ investment plans that underpins the growing balance 
sheet fragility of the economy over the business cycle. The creation of money by banks still 
underpins and amplifies capitalist instability. This does not mean that non-bank financial 
institutions are not important.5 As already mentioned, CMF’s analysis of market-based finance 
has tremendously improved our understanding of today’s financial dynamics, and Post 
Keynesian monetary theory is compatible with and enriched by the observation that non-bank 
82Bonizzi and Kaltenbrunner
financial institutions can create further credit in addition to bank credit (see Lavoie, 2019). But 
banks still remain special in an endogenous money framework, which is ultimately at odds 
with the claim that “the normal banking transaction [is] the issuance of commercial paper 
matched by the issuance of money-market fund shares, rather than the creation of a bank 
loan matched by an increase in deposits” (Neilson, 2019: 15).
Money, Minsky, and external vulnerability in emerging markets
The analytical power of approaching CMF via a Post Keynesian interpretation of liquidity 
preference theory and endogenous money can be shown via two examples, both taken from 
our work on financial fragility and external vulnerability in emerging market economies (EMEs) 
(Kaltenbrunner and Painceira, 2015; Bonizzi and Kaltenbrunner, 2018). As discussed above, 
CMF makes a fundamental contribution to Post Keynesian monetary theory by developing an 
institutionally sensitive form of analysis that takes seriously the liability side of agents’ balance 
sheets. The interdependent nature of balance sheets is arguably even more important in the 
context of cross-border capital flows, which span different regulatory and currency spaces with 
significant implications for financial instability. In particular, our work points to the structural 
pressures arising from cross-border liability structures and the power that international 
creditors exert over debtors in the Global South. Our Post Keynesian reading of these balance 
sheet dynamics points to the monetary nature underlying these structures and power 
relations, as only one currency (currently the US Dollar) can be the global means of settlement 
and hence the currency of the system. Moreover, it shows the implications these monetary 
dynamics have for the macro-economy via their influence on key macroeconomic prices, in 
particular the interest rate and the exchange rate. 
Indeed, despite sound macroeconomic fundamentals, record levels of foreign exchange 
reserves, and a reduction in their foreign currency denominated debt (‘original sin’), EMEs 
have been subject to large and sudden waves of international capital flows, largely 
independent of domestic conditions. These new forms of external vulnerability, we argue, are 
due to the fact that whilst foreign investors in EMEs are increasingly prepared to hold EME 
domestic currency assets, they do not issue their liabilities in them. In other words, whereas 
foreign investors have increasingly accepted EME currencies as a store of wealth,6 they do not 
use these as unit of account of their financial obligations or means of contractual settlement. 
By contrast, the US Dollar remains the main international funding currency, denominating 
more than three-quarters of international liabilities. 
This has three consequences for financial stability and key macroeconomic prices (in 
particular the exchange rate). First, it creates a currency mismatch in foreign investors’ 
balance sheets that makes them highly sensitive to expected exchange rate changes, creating 
the risk of self-reinforcing feedback dynamics. The second consequence, linked to the fact that 
foreign investors’ liabilities remain denominated in foreign currency and are frequently located 
in core financial centres, is that it makes their portfolio decisions very dependent on 
conditions in those markets and de-links them from the specific economic situation in EMEs. 
Any change in international funding conditions may require these investors to withdraw their 
investments to meet these liabilities. This shows the structural pressures emanating from 
agents’ liability structures. Finally, these global balance sheet structures create an inherent 
demand for the global funding currency (the US Dollar), which has been exemplified by the 
appreciation of the Dollar during the subprime and more recent corona crises. This final point 
illustrates the implicit – and indeed sometimes explicit – power structures arising out of 
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international debtor-creditor relations and the constraints these create for macroeconomic 
policy and management (Kaltenbrunner and Painceira, 2017). 
Our second example focuses on a specific dimension of these broader trends, applying a 
Minskyan analysis of the vulnerability of demand for EME assets to the behaviour of pension 
funds (Bonizzi and Kaltenbrunner, 2018). Since the mid-2000s, these large institutions have 
come to adopt new investment frameworks in response to various structural changes in the 
financial markets, such as the secular decline in interest rates, their increasing maturity, as 
well as accounting and regulatory changes. Concretely, pension funds split their portfolio into 
two sections, one dedicated to ‘protecting’ the portfolio from the risks of volatile liabilities, the 
other to ‘growing’ the size of the portfolio. Crucially, liquidity preference is institutionally driven: 
the allocation between growth (risky assets producing high expected returns) and protection 
(liquid assets producing predictable cash-flows) is driven by the overall gap and maturity 
profile of the pension funds balance sheet.7 For pension funds, EME assets cannot match 
liabilities, and nor are they sufficiently liquid to produce safe cash-flow to settle obligations. 
Therefore, pension funds demand EME assets only if there is a need for growth, which in turn 
depends on the institutionally driven liquidity preference of pension funds. 
The above describes how the stability of EME asset demand works through the balance 
sheets of pension funds. This shows a specific way in which EME currencies remain 
subordinate to other currencies. As they do not generally fulfil the means of settlement 
function, EME assets are always demanded as risky/satellite assets. Therefore, the demand 
for EME assets partly depends on their changing ability (or, more importantly, compensation 
for their inability) to settle liabilities, i.e., to work as ‘money’ internationally. Crucially, this 
depends on the global state of liquidity preference, which does not have much to do with 
EMEs’ domestic conditions. Recent debates about global liquidity as a key determinant of 
international financial flows arrive at a similar point: there is not much EMEs by themselves 
can do to weather the cycles of global finance. 
These examples demonstrate the explanatory promise of a joint Post Keynesian/CMF 
approach, which combines a detailed institutional analysis of the balance sheets of particular 
actors with an attention to those factors that have saliency for real economic dynamics, 
underpinned throughout by an appreciation of the uniqueness of money as the means of 
settlement and unit of account at the global level.
Conclusion
In this forum contribution, we have argued that Post Keynesian and CMF scholarship would 
benefit from a more explicit engagement with each other. CMF is a promising new area of 
research, which revives and expands Minskyan ideas about liquidity and balance sheets. Post 
Keynesian scholars would benefit from the detailed empirical insights that CMF provides, 
particularly through its analysis of non-bank financial institutions and the conceptual focus on 
liquidity and liabilities. On the other hand, the CMF literature would benefit from more explicit 
grounding in earlier Post Keynesian concepts. In particular, the theory of liquidity preference 
and the concept of the liquidity premium point towards the uniqueness of money as a means 
of settlement and unit of account. The theory of endogenous money highlights the special 
nature of banks and the circulation of money in the real economy. In short, Post Keynesians 
would do well to engage with the ‘finance’ in CMF scholarship, while CMF scholars would do 
well to engage with the ‘macro’ in Post Keynesian economics. After all, Minsky and Keynes’ 
unique ability to combine realistic macroeconomics with finance is what makes their insights 
timeless.
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Notes
1.    Minsky’s theory has also been developed in at least two other directions by Post Keynesian 
authors. One of these focuses on the modelling of financial instability; the other contributed to the 
development of Modern Monetary Theory, mainly through Randall Wray, who was Minsky’s PhD 
student.
2.    See also Sissoko (2019), who argues that the current market-based system has further 
strengthened the power of creditors due to repo market lending.
3.    Although separating these different motives analytically, Keynes (1997: 195) also stressed that 
the “money held for each of the three purposes forms, nevertheless, a single pool, which the 
holder is under no necessity to segregate into three water-tight compartments”. 
4.    These views are shared by proponents of Modern Monetary Theory. Bell (1998: 8), for example, 
argues that “neither the State nor the banks rely on convertibility for acceptance of their promises; 
what makes them both acceptable is not convertibility into something else but acceptance in 
payment to one’s creditors” (emphasis added).
5.    Indeed, our research on emerging economies focused on the role of non-bank institutions in 
driving capital flows and determining exchange rates (Bonizzi and Kaltenbrunner, 2019; 
forthcoming).
6.    However, de Souza Lima Orsi (2019) argues that rather than seeking true stores of wealth, these 
investments are instead speculative and short term.
7.    In practice this consists in minimising funding (i.e., asset/liability) gaps by hedging various types of 
risk (especially interest rate risk) and ensuring liquidity in the short run.
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